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Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes) 
 











It is widely held in philosophy that knowing is not a state of mind. On this view, rather than 
knowledge itself constituting a mental state, when we know, we occupy a belief state that 
exhibits some additional non-mental characteristics. Fascinatingly, however, new empirical 
findings from cognitive neuroscience and experimental philosophy now offer direct, 
converging evidence that the brain can—and often does—treat knowledge as if it is a mental 
state in its own right. While some might be tempted to keep the metaphysics of epistemic 
states separate from the neurocognitive mechanics of our judgements about them, here I will 
argue that these empirical findings give us sufficient reason to conclude that knowledge is at 
least sometimes a mental state. The basis of this argument is the epistemological principle of 
neurocognitive parity—roughly, if the contents of a given judgement reflect the structure of 
knowledge, so do the neurocognitive mechanics that produced them. This principle, which I 
defend here, straightforwardly supports the inference from the empirical observation that the 
brain sometimes treats knowledge like a mental state to the epistemological conclusion that 
knowledge is at least sometimes a mental state. All told, the composite, belief-centric 
metaphysics of knowledge widely assumed in epistemology is almost certainly mistaken. 
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1. Introduction: Knowledge as a Mental State 
 
Contrasting with paradigm mental states like belief, desire, and pain, it is widely held in 
philosophy that knowing is not a state of mind in its own right. Instead, most epistemologists 
take knowledge to be what might be described as a “composite” (Nagel 2013, 275) or 
“metaphysical hybrid” (Williamson 2000, 50), on which being in the state of knowledge 
requires both being in the mental state of belief and fulfilling some additional non-mental 
conditions. On this picture, while being in a mental state (i.e. belief) is necessary for knowing 
that p, there is no mental state for which being in that state is sufficient for knowing that p. 
This position has been famously challenged by both Williamson (2000) and Nagel (2013), 
who maintain that knowledge is in fact a mental state in its own right. That is, there is some 
mental state for which being in that state is both necessary and sufficient for knowing that p. 
Nevertheless, while this position has been widely discussed (see e.g. Greenough and 
Pritchard 2009; Gendler and Hawthorne 2013, chapters 10-13; McGlynn 2014; Carter et al. 
2017), it has attracted little additional support beyond its two main proponents. As 
summarized by Nagel, “the current climate in philosophy is largely hostile to the idea that 
knowledge is a mental state” (2013, 274). 
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 My aim in this paper is to advance a new line of support for the claim that knowledge 
is a mental state. This support will come by way of new behavioral and neurocognitive 
findings—including our first direct look into how the brain attributes knowledge—together 
with an epistemological parity principle that facilitates an inference from how the brain 
attributes knowledge to what knowledge is actually like. While I don’t want to say that we 
can always infer the nature of knowledge from how the brain attributes it, I will argue that we 
have compelling reason to think that, in the case of these specific empirical findings, we can 
make such an inference. As, in this particular case, the brain attributes knowledge like a 
mental state, we can then conclude that knowledge, in this particular case, is in fact a mental 
state. 
 Going into this argument, however, it is important that we don’t misunderstand the 
precise nature of the support it lends to the thesis that knowledge is a mental state. Crucially, 
this argument alone only gives us reason to think that there is a mental state for which being 
in that state is sufficient for knowing that p. Put another way, this argument can presently 
only support that claim that knowledge is at least sometimes a mental state, not that it is 
always a mental state. This follows directly from the empirical nature of the argument. Since 
we currently only know how the brain attributes knowledge in a small range of cases, we 
cannot eliminate the possibility that in certain other cases the brain attributes knowledge like 
a composite. In such a case, being in some type of mental state would remain necessary for 
knowing that p, but what type mental state this is might vary. For this reason, we should 
refrain from concluding on the basis of this argument alone that knowledge is a mental state, 
full stop. 
 Nevertheless, if one is already sympathetic to the idea that knowledge is a mental 
state—in the sense that being in some mental state is both necessary and sufficient for 
knowing—then my argument for sufficiency of course lends additional support to the idea as 
a whole. Similarly, if one is of the conviction that knowledge must display a unitary 
metaphysics,1 my argument again supports the broader claim that knowledge is a mental 
state. While I am hesitant to make such a commitment, finding it far too easy to imagine 
discovering cases in which the brain attributes knowledge like a composite, I do recognize 
that this is the natural conclusion if we think that no knowledge states might be more mental 
than others. 
 Furthermore, even without any firm commitment to the idea that knowledge is always 
a mental state, the observation that it is at least sometimes a mental state is sufficient to 
undermine the widely held composite metaphysics of knowledge.2 Whatever the exact 
metaphysical composition of knowledge ultimately proves to be, at this point we can be 
confident that a unitary composite framework, on which knowledge is always a composite of 
belief with additional non-mental features, is insufficient. It is in this precise manner that the 
argument I’ll present here offers a motivation for moving away from the idea that knowledge 
is just a species of belief. 
 In developing this argument, this paper is structured in the following way: First, I’ll 
start with a discussion of the neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for our judgements 
about knowledge, which provide compelling evidence that the brain often attributes simple 
perceptual knowledge like it is a mental state (§2). Next, I’ll examine Nagel’s argument that 
the mechanics of mental state attribution provide a reliable guide to the metaphysics of 
knowledge, highlighting a key shortcoming of this approach (§3). After this, I’ll present my 
 
1 That is, different knowledge states cannot have varying metaphysical compositions. If knowledge is sometimes 
just a mental state, then knowledge is only ever just a mental state.  
2 Far too many accounts of knowledge assume this composite metaphysics to exhaustively recount here. Some 
of the most influential come from Goldman (e.g. 1986), Kornblith (2002), Pritchard (e.g. 2005; 2012), and Sosa 
(e.g. 1999; 2007). See Ichikawa and Steup (2018) for an overview of many of these accounts. 
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own argument that the way in which the brain processes knowledge attributions should 
inform how we think about the metaphysics of knowledge, an argument which derives from 
the principle of neurocognitive parity (§4). Finally, I’ll close by discussing some of the 
questions left open by my present account, along with its most significant implications (§5).  
 
 
2. Knowledge Attribution in the Brain 
 
If we are to infer the nature of knowledge from how the brain computes knowledge 
attributions, as is the goal of this paper, we’ll need at least two key ingredients. One of these 
ingredients is some sort of epistemological principle to facilitate this inference, which will be 
the topic of the following two sections. First, however, in this section I want to provide the 
other key ingredient, an empirical perspective on how the brain computes knowledge 
attributions. This perspective will situate pioneering behavioral findings from Phillips et al. 
(2018) and my own EEG study (Bricker 2020)—the first to apply neuroimaging techniques to 
knowledge attribution—within a broader context offered by experimental philosophy and 
developmental and comparative psychology (see especially Phillips et al. 2020). The main 
takeaway from these studies is simple: At least for cases of ordinary perception, the brain 
does not appear to attribute knowledge like a composite state. Instead, at the neurocognitive 
level, this knowledge is attributed like a mental state in its own right. Here I’ll limit 
discussion to the neurocognitive properties of knowledge attribution, reserving the 
epistemological implications for the following sections. 
 To start, it might be helpful to note that the neurocognitive perspective I’ll offer here 
differs from the biases-and-heuristics cognitive psychology of knowledge attribution favored 
by some epistemologists in the past decade (e.g. Nagel 2010; Gerken 2012). I have a number 
of reasons for preferring the neurocognitive perspective. The first is simply a matter of 
generality. While the biases-and-heuristics approach focuses on narrow bands of knowledge 
attribution, especially odd cases in which something might be going wrong, here I’m 
interested in the mechanisms that govern ordinary, everyday cases in which everything seems 
to go right. My second reason is the more practical matter of what empirical evidence we 
presently have available to us. While the studies I’ll discuss (primarily Phillips et al. 2018 
and Bricker 2020) provide us with a direct look into the neurocognitive mechanisms of 
knowledge attribution, both the Nagel and Gerken accounts were largely based on biases 
observed empirically for belief attribution. This seems to have derived from the tendency of 
psychology-oriented philosophers of knowledge attribution to assume that “knowledge 
involves belief or a belief-like attitude” (Gerken 2012, 148). However, as we’ll see shortly, 
empirical evidence now suggests that this assumption is mistaken. Belief attribution seems to 
recruit neurocognitive processes (i.e. self-perspective inhibition) in ways that knowledge 
attribution does not. Accordingly, we cannot safely assume that the mechanisms of belief 
attribution generalize to knowledge attribution—direct empirical evidence from studies about 
knowledge attribution is needed. As is illustrated by a number of recent accounts of 
knowledge attribution (Bricker 2020; Phillips et al. 2020; Westra and Nagel 2021), all of 
which eschew the belief-derived biases-and-heuristics approach, the knowledge-first program 
likely represents the future of this research. Finally, the neurocognitive perspective also 
offers the opportunity for converging evidence in a way that isn’t easily replicated by 
cognitive psychology. For example, as we’ll see below, electrophysiological measurements, 
reaction time data, and attribution reports all point in the same direction, which allows us to 
make more confident conclusions about the mechanisms of knowledge attribution. In short, 
for all these reasons, contrasting with certain previous philosophical approaches to 
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knowledge attribution, our starting point here will be the neurocognitive perspective: What 
can cognitive neuroscience tell us about how we think about the mental states of others? 
As it happens, there is a wealth of research in cognitive neuroscience regarding how 
the brain processes the mental states of others, a cognitive capacity often referred to as 
“Theory of Mind” (ToM; for an overview, see Heleven & Van Overwalle 2018). This 
research focuses primarily on belief states and has revealed a number of distinct 
neurocognitive processes that contribute to belief attribution. Here I will focus on two such 
processes: (i) perspective taking and (ii) self-perspective inhibition. First, in order to form 
accurate judgements about what S believes, it is necessary to both take S’s perspective and 
inhibit one’s own self-perspective (Heleven & Van Overwalle 2018). At the intuitive level, 
this is easy to make sense of—What S believes is of course a function of information 
available on her perspective, and self-perspective information might interfere with the 
process of taking S’s perspective, especially when the information available on the two 
perspective differs. Less obvious at the intuitive level, however, is that these two processes 
are neurocognitively distinct. Not only have neuropsychological studies observed a double 
dissociation between self-perspective inhibition and perspective taking (Samson et al. 2004; 
Samson et al. 2005), but a number of fMRI studies indicate distinct neural correlates for the 
two processes, with perspective taking being broadly associated with the temporoparietal 
junction (Schuwerk et al. 2014; Özdem et al. 2019) and self-perspective taking the inferior 
frontal gyrus (van Der Meer et al. 2011; Hartwright et al. 2012; Hartwright et al. 2015). 
Fascinatingly, it even appears that self-perspective inhibition is distinct from more general 
inhibitory control in the brain (Hartwright et al. 2015). In short, we have good reason to think 
that belief attribution recruits (at least) two distinct neurocognitive process: perspective 
taking and self-perspective inhibition. 
Although cognitive neuroscience has revealed a good deal about how the brain 
processes belief attributions, as well as mental state attribution generally, until quite recently, 
surprisingly little attention has been directed towards the direct study of knowledge 
attribution. While comparative and developmental psychology have long studied the 
respective phylogeny and ontogeny of knowledge representation (for an excellent review, see 
Phillips et al. 2020), the processes underlying the computation of knowledge attributions in 
the adult human brain have gone comparatively overlooked. Accordingly, we are only 
beginning to understand the extent to which the neurocognitive mechanics of belief 
attribution are shared by knowledge attribution.  
An important early step in this direction comes from my own recent neurocognitive 
study (Bricker 2020), which used EEG to record neural activity during both belief and 
knowledge attribution. This study employed simple cartoons as stimuli, which varyingly 
depicted states of belief, knowledge, and ignorance, and was specifically designed to directly 
investigate whether the brain attributes knowledge like a composite or mental state. 
Fascinatingly, in no uncertain terms, the results of the study strongly indicate that knowledge 
is in fact attributed like a mental state by our neurocognitive systems, a conclusion which was 
supported by two independent lines of evidence: (1) Reaction time data showed no significant 
differences between belief and knowledge attribution conditions. If the brain computed 
knowledge attributions like knowledge were a composite—i.e. taking belief attribution to be 
a stage of knowledge attribution—we would of course expect the computation of knowledge 
attributions to take longer. (2) Knowledge attribution doesn’t display the same strong self-
perspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. Were belief attribution a stage of 
knowledge attribution, we would of course expect the same strong self-perspective inhibition 
for knowledge attribution. As I concluded at the time, these results “provide quite compelling 
behavioral and electrophysiological evidence in favor of the thesis that knowledge is 
attributed like a mental state” (2020, 8). 
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The findings of this study converge with previous behavioral findings reported by 
Phillips et al. (2018), which observed faster response times for knowledge attribution vs. 
belief attribution. Using short vignettes featuring an epistemic agent in some simple scenario, 
this study asked participants to evaluate whether statements about the agent’s beliefs or 
knowledge were true or false. Phillips et al. reported faster response times for judgements 
about knowledge vs. belief not only in cases of attribution, but also in negative evaluations of 
the respective states. Again, this observation is flatly inconsistent with a belief computation 
stage for judgements about knowledge. As put by the authors, “knowledge assessment may 
often not depend on prior evaluations of belief” (2018, 2263). 
It would of course be a bit hasty to make any definitive conclusions on the basis of a 
pair of empirical studies, and I’ll be the first to concede that additional neurocognitive 
research into knowledge attribution is sorely needed. However, it would be equally mistaken 
to take these studies as isolated data points. Instead, the assertion that the brain attributes 
knowledge like a mental state is best understood as a direct confirmation of what we’ve long 
had reason to suspect. Not only do previously reported knowledge attribution reports (Myers-
Schulz and Schwitzgebel 2013; Murray et al. 2013) indicate that knowledge attribution can 
occur in the absence of a belief-attribution stage, but as noted by both myself (Bricker 2020) 
and Nagel (2013), those working in the ToM research program often already include 
knowledge in their list of paradigm mental states. Nagel goes further, offering a 
comprehensive account of evidence from both developmental and comparative psychology 
that points in this direction (2013, §3)—Most notably, both young human children (e.g. 
Hogrefe et al. 1986) and certain non-human primates (e.g. Kaminski et al. 2008) display a 
knowledge-attributing capacity that outstrips their belief-attributing capacity. More recently, 
Phillips et al. have similarly argued from a wide range of evidence—spanning comparative 
and developmental psychology, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science—that 
knowledge representation is more basic than belief representation, going so far as to advocate 
for a “shift of focus” in Theory of Mind research towards a more knowledge-centric approach 
(2020, 1). Together, all this constitutes a compelling, convergent case that the brain attributes 
knowledge like a mental state in its own right. 
As exciting as all this is, however, at this point we need to put the brakes on any 
excess enthusiasm to ensure that things don’t get out of hand. None of the available evidence 
suggests, in any way, that the neurocognitive systems of human adults exclusively attribute 
knowledge like a mental state. Developmental and comparative psychology doesn’t directly 
tell us anything about everyday knowledge attribution in human adults; experimental 
philosophy only offers evidence from a handful of highly specific cases (Myers-Schulz and 
Schwitzgebel 2013; Murray et al. 2013); and the only cognitive (Phillips et al. 2018) and 
neurocognitive (Bricker 2020) evidence presently available exclusively involves the 
attribution of simple perceptual knowledge. To be clear, there isn’t presently any 
neurocognitive evidence that the brain sometimes also attributes knowledge like a composite. 
However, we cannot at this time exclude this due to a simple lack of research into the 
neurocognitive mechanics of knowledge attribution. Accordingly, here we need to be careful 
to refrain from making any general claims that go beyond what is presently supported by 
extant empirical evidence. While the brain does attribute knowledge like a mental state, at 
least in cases of ordinary perceptual knowledge, we cannot confidently conclude at this time 
that it always attributes knowledge like a mental state. 
With this final word of moderation, we’ve reached the end of the empirical portion of 
this paper. Now comes the challenging question, which constitutes our primary concern 
here—Can we infer that (at least) perceptual knowledge actually can be a mental state on the 
basis of how our ToM systems attribute knowledge? I of course think that we can, but this 
inference is anything but trivial. In the next section, I’ll first consider Nagel’s argument that 
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the metaphysics of knowledge applied by our knowledge-attributing cognitive systems 
should be treated at broadly correct, before highlighting one of this argument’s key 
shortcomings. Following that, I’ll introduce my own, quite different argument for the same 
sort of conclusion. 
 
 
3. Nagel’s Argument 
 
In the previous section, I discussed some exciting new empirical findings regarding 
knowledge attribution. These findings directly confirm what indirect empirical evidence 
already indicated—the brain can and often does attribute knowledge to others like knowledge 
is a mental state. On this basis, I want to argue against the composite view of knowledge 
favored by many epistemologists. That is, I think we might reasonably conclude that 
knowledge is (at least sometimes) a mental state on the grounds that our knowledge-
attributing systems treat it like one. As it so happens, an argument of this form has already 
been advanced by Nagel (2013, §4), which will be our focus for this section. Ultimately, I 
will conclude that Nagel’s argument commits to an empirical assumption that is not generally 
defensible—the assumption that the accuracy of a cognitive process is evidence for the 
veracity of the metaphysics it applies.3 For this reason, I don’t think that this argument 
presents the best path forward. Before discussing this shortcoming in detail, however, I first 
need to say a bit about the argument itself. 
The context from which Nagel’s argument originates isn’t entirely unlike the situation 
in which we find ourselves now.4 After detailing empirical findings indicating that our ToM 
systems attribute knowledge like a mental state, Nagel notes that this alone might not be 
considered sufficient to grant that knowledge actually is a mental state: 
 
Even if our natural mindreading5 systems parse agency with the help of the epistemic mental 
state concepts of knowledge and belief rather than belief alone, one might worry that mental 
reality could fail to correspond to our natural way of tracking it. (2013, 301) 
 
This, of course, is none other than the very challenge that the present paper seeks to address. 
Nagel’s strategy for solving this problem is somewhat tricky to parse, but it centers on the 
idea that knowledge-based explanations generally facilitate more accurate predictions about 
the actions of others than belief-based explanations. The key contrast Nagel draws is between 
(1) “intuitive” (2013, 301) knowledge-based predictions, which rely on “trust in our natural 
instincts” (2013, 302), and (2) belief-based predictions, which rely on “reflection” and more 
“cognitive effort” (2013, 302). As the belief-based cognitive strategy “generates an 
awkwardly large space of possibilities to be contemplated, and our capacity to reason 
accurately about all those possibilities is limited” (2013, 302), we might understand why the 
knowledge-based strategy—which doesn’t entail this “serial contemplation of various 
possibilities” (2013, 302)—might “[enable] us to make better predictions” (2013, 302) about 
 
3 Note that this shortcoming has been previously noticed by McGlynn (2014, 186). 
4 There are of course some key contextual dissimilarities as well. Most notably, Nagel didn’t have direct 
neurocognitive evidence available to her. Additionally, and perhaps for this reason, the relatively short text 
dedicated to this present argument indicates that Nagel considered the empirical component more demanding. 
Her argument from empirical findings to the metaphysics of knowledge, presented under the header 
“Conclusion,” reads almost like an afterthought. My attitude is almost diametrically opposed. Especially given 
the empirical findings discussed above (§2), establishing what our knowledge-attributing systems do is the easy 
part. The epistemologically interesting bit is establishing the conditions on which the brain’s metaphysics of 
knowledge ought to be taken seriously. 
5 Mindreading is roughly synonymous with ToM here. 
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the actions of others. On the basis of this putatively greater accuracy of the knowledge-based 
strategy—which I’ll not dispute here6—Nagel concludes that knowledge really is, 
ontologically, a mental state.  
 Nagel’s conclusion, crucially, rests on the key assumption that this accuracy generally 
constitutes evidence that the correct mental state ontology is being applied by our knowledge-
attributing systems. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be clear why the effectiveness of treating 
knowledge like a mental state in predicting action has any bearing on whether knowledge is 
actually a mental state. However, this assumption is, at a minimum, misguided. In order to 
understand why, let’s first note that what it appears Nagel has done is appeal to something 
like a two-systems account (see Evans 2008) for cognitive strategies of action prediction. 
Here, the knowledge-based strategy resembles a type-I process: fast, intuitive, and heuristic 
in the strict sense that it systematically excludes some of the available information. In 
contrast, the belief-based strategy resembles a type-II process: reflective, requiring more 
cognitive effort, and incorporating more available information. This heuristic characterization 
of the knowledge-based strategy, however, should immediately raise red flags for the key 
assumption of Nagel’s argument. Especially when dealing with cognitive heuristics, not only 
is the accuracy of a cognitive strategy for predicting Xs not generally associated with the 
application the correct metaphysics underlying X, it is in fact often associated with 
application of the incorrect metaphysics underlying X. 
This frequently inverse relationship between the predictive accuracy of a cognitive 
strategy and the veracity of the metaphysics applied by that strategy is clearly illustrated by 
the “less-is-more effects” displayed by a number of cognitive heuristics (see Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier 2011). While not usually discussed in such terms, a heuristic displaying a less-is-
more effect is generally characterized by a high degree of accuracy in some task predicting 
Xs, often matching or even outperforming far more complex statistical methods, despite not 
applying anything close to the correct metaphysics of X. For example, the recognition 
heuristic—on which one of two alternatives is selected on the basis of being recognized—has 
been demonstrated to produce surprisingly accurate predictions about victories in tennis 
tournaments (Serwe & Frings 2006; Scheibehenne & Bröder 2007) and performance of 
investment portfolios (Ortmann et al. 2008). However, it would of course be a mistake to 
make any inferences about recognizability being constitutive of the metaphysics of athletic 
prowess, the soundness of investment, or whatever concepts we might take to actually 
explain the respective observations the recognition heuristic successfully predicts. Something 
similar holds for a number of other cognitive heuristics,7 and the point here is quite clear: 
Especially where heuristics are involved, we simply cannot reasonably assume that predictive 
accuracy (e.g. for human action) is associated with the correct underlying metaphysics (e.g. 
for the mental states underlying human action). For this reason, at least as it stands, I don’t 
think that Nagel’s approach represents the best way forward. 
One way we might address this shortcoming in Nagel’s argument would be to double 
down on the cognitive psychology—We might ask whether knowledge attribution actually 
displays the characteristics of heuristic decision making, which could then serve as a guide to 
whether we attribute knowledge by applying the actual metaphysics of knowledge. However, 
especially for the reasons discussed at the start of section two, I think that our energy can be 
spent more efficiently by applying an entirely different strategy: identifying an 
epistemological principle that allows us to plausibly infer the metaphysical composition of 
knowledge on the basis of the neurocognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution. In the 
next section, my goal is to do just that. 
 
6 Although note that Phillips et al. have argued precisely the opposite, maintaining that knowledge attribution is 
“poorly suited to predicting other agents’ behavior” (2020, §6.1). 
7 At a minimum, the fluency and “one reason” heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011). 
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4. Neurocognitive Parity 
 
My aim with this section is to argue in support of an epistemological principle, which I’ve 
opted to call “neurocognitive parity.” This principle, I will maintain, is quite a modest 
proposal. It strikes me as highly intuitive, and I struggle to anticipate how one might 
plausibly object to it. Crucially, however, this principle is invaluable for our purposes, as it 
provides a straightforward basis on which we might infer that knowledge is a mental state on 
the basis that our neurocognitive knowledge-attributing systems treat it like one. In arguing in 
support of this principle, this section will begin by considering a familiar case—that of the 
potentially biased cognitive mechanism for knowledge attribution—in which I think we can 
already see something like neurocognitive parity at work. After this, I’ll provide my preferred 
formulation for this principle, along with an account of why it seems so plausible. Finally, I’ll 
close by discussing how it straightforwardly allows us to conclude, on the basis of the 
empirical findings outlined in section two, that knowledge is indeed a mental state.  
 Let’s start by imagining a case in which the content of some class of judgements 
about knowledge appears to have major implications for how we theorize about the structure 
of knowledge. Perhaps, in the content of these judgements, knowledge is attributed in ways 
that are inconsistent with some dominant theory of knowledge, suggesting some mistake in 
this theory. However, imagine further that epistemologists cannot agree on whether this 
judgement content actually reflects the structure of knowledge, and therefore cannot agree on 
whether we need to adjust our theories of knowledge to accommodate it. Perhaps some 
epistemologists don’t share in this judgement content, others only weakly, while still others 
hold this dominant theory so sacrosanct as to preclude the legitimacy of this judgement 
content. In short, regardless of the reason, it isn’t clear whether this class of judgement 
content actually reflects the structure of knowledge. Now, let’s posit that these judgements 
form via a cognitive process that is in some way faulty, so that, in the epistemic vignettes 
associated with this class of judgements, the judgement mechanics clearly don’t reflect the 
structure of knowledge.8 Instead, the cognitive processes that produce this judgement content 
are sensitive to some entirely different feature of these cases. 
 Provided that the mechanics via which these judgements form do not reflect the 
structure of knowledge, I now want to ask whether we think that the content of these 
judgements reflects the structure of knowledge, thereby giving us reason to revise our 
dominant theory of knowledge to accommodate this content. At the risk of overplaying my 
hand, I’d submit that the appropriate response here is, “No. Quite obviously no.” Not only is 
my own personal response a quite definitive no, I struggle to imagine why anyone would take 
the content of some epistemic judgement to tell us something about the structure of 
knowledge when the mechanics that produced this judgement are known to be faulty, not 
themselves reflecting the structure of knowledge but some other feature in the case. 
Moreover, it doesn’t appear that I am alone here. As it happens, we see this sort of intuition 
reflected in a number of prominent arguments that have been advanced in epistemology. 
While differing on the purportedly faulty mechanics, these arguments have all maintained 
that the contents of certain judgements (particularly those associated with contextualism) 
don’t reflect the structure of knowledge, all on the basis that the underlying judgement 
mechanics fail to do so: Hawthorne (2004) and Williamson (2005) have both argued this on 
the basis of the availability heuristic, Nagel via egocentric bias (2010), and Gerken from 
“epistemic focal bias” (2013). While we have reason to question whether any of these 
putatively faulty mechanics are actually realized in knowledge attribution (discussed in §2; 
 
8 It is important to not confuse this sense of “faulty” with unreliability. As discussed in the previous section, it 
could still be that these faulty mechanisms generally produce correct judgements despite not reflecting the 
structure of knowledge. 
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see also Bricker 2020, §4.4), this isn’t the point. Instead, the point here is that, were the 
mechanics to fail to reflect the structure of knowledge in any of the suggested ways, this 
would clearly give us ample reason to conclude the same about the content they produce.  
 I’d suggest that our intuition here is a reflection of an epistemological parity principle, 
a principle I’ll choose to express in the following way: 
 
NEUROCOGNITIVE PARITY: The contents of judgement J about knowledge reflect the 
structure of knowledge only if the mechanics of the neural and cognitive processes 
responsible for J also reflect the structure of knowledge. 
 
With the principle of neurocognitive parity now laid out in this way, I want to clarify some of 
the terms I’ve been using from the onset of this section. First, the content of an intuitive 
judgement about knowledge simply refers to what some particular case is judged to be, 
knowledge or not knowledge. To take a familiar example, in the original Gettier cases (1963), 
the content of our judgements is that S (i.e. Smith or Jones) doesn’t know. Conversely, the 
mechanics referred to here are the empirical properties of knowledge-attributing processes, 
like those discussed in section two. For example, the mechanics we are presently interested in 
are core Theory of Mind systems with reduced self-perspective inhibition—critically with no 
belief-attribution stage—which we can then express as the brain attributing knowledge “like 
a mental state in its own right.” Next, structure here refers both the metaphysical composition 
of knowledge states (Are they composite or entirely mental?) as well as additional properties 
we might think are associated with knowledge states (e.g. Are they factive? Are they safe? 
etc.).  Finally, likely the most important idea to nail down here is what it means for some 
component of our judgements about knowledge—either its content or mechanics—to reflect 
the structure of knowledge. Although I’m not sure that I can provide a complete account of 
this reflection relation, roughly speaking, it just means standing in the right sort of evidential 
relation with the concept of knowledge to infer the structure of knowledge from properties of 
judgement content/mechanics. Moreover, as I think we have a strong intuitive sense of what 
it means to reflect (or not reflect) the structure of knowledge, I’m not sure that a complete 
account is entirely necessary. After all, we freely apply this idea when we make arguments 
about the structure of knowledge on the basis of our judgement content in some case, and I 
don’t think it’s especially cryptic to claim that, “The way in which knowledge is attributed in 
the brain reflects the structure of knowledge.” Nevertheless, to perhaps clarify things a bit 
further, I can offer something of a heuristic test for reflection—Do you that think that our 
theories of knowledge should be expected to accommodate some given judgement’s contents 
or mechanics? If so, then you likely think that those contents/mechanics reflect the structure 
of knowledge. 
 Taking all this together, the principle of neurocognitive parity then says that, if what 
we judge about knowledge in some case stands in the right sort of evidential relation with the 
concept of knowledge to tell us something about its (e.g.) metaphysical composition, then the 
cognitive and neural details of how this judgment forms also stands in the right sort of 
evidential relation with the concept of knowledge to tell us something about its metaphysical 
composition. Put a bit more simply, if what we judge is potential evidence for the nature of 
knowledge, so too is how the brain produces those judgements. This might be the easiest way 
to think about Neurocognitive Parity—an if what, then how principle. To whatever extent we 
take the what of knowledge attribution to potentially indicate the (e.g.) metaphysical 
composition of knowledge, we must also grant the same for the how. To be clear, 
neurocognitive parity of course doesn’t say that the mechanics of knowledge attributions 
always reflect the structure of knowledge, just as we don’t want to say something similar 
about the content of every knowledge attribution. The point of neurocognitive parity is 
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simply that when the content of judgements about knowledge can evidence the structure of 
knowledge, so too can the neurocognitive mechanics responsible for that content. 
 It is my contention that something like neurocognitive parity is overwhelmingly 
plausible. Its plausibility arises from the simple fact that the contents of judgements about 
knowledge are inextricably linked with the neurocognitive processes that produce them. If a 
judgement about knowledge is non-accidentally indicative of the structure of knowledge—
indicative in a way that allows us to make reliable inferences about knowledge’s 
metaphysical composition—this evidential value must be in virtue of the processes by which 
it was generated. Otherwise, it is unclear how we might explain this evidential potential in the 
first place.9 Allowing for the quite benign supposition that intuitive judgements about 
knowledge are indicative of the structure of knowledge in virtue of the processes that produce 
them,10 we might then ask how it is that these processes encode the correct structure of 
knowledge into a judgement’s content. The answer, I would submit, is simply that these 
processes themselves reflect the structure of knowledge. To the extent that the content of our 
epistemic judgements evidences the structure of knowledge, it is the mechanics of the 
neurocognitive processes that guide these judgements which are responsible for this. That is 
to say, the mechanics must, in some way, reflect the actual structure of knowledge. This is 
why, as we saw at the beginning of this section, we so readily withdraw the evidential status 
of the content of epistemic judgements upon realizing that the mechanics of those judgements 
don’t actually reflect the structure of knowledge. Apart from those mechanics reflecting the 
structure of knowledge, it just isn’t clear why we might think the same for the content they 
produce. 
 For this reason, I am quite confident that we might reasonably accept the principle of 
neurocognitive parity as a rather mild expression of the mechanisms by which the evidential 
potential of judgements about knowledge arises in the first place. To be clear, I don’t want to 
argue here that neurocognitive parity holds for every conceivable judgement about 
knowledge, if for no other reason than this claim is quite strong, and I don’t have to make it. 
Instead, the safer thing to do is just take neurocognitive parity as something like the default 
state for our judgements about knowledge. In the absence of some case-specific reason to 
think otherwise, we should be entirely comfortable with the idea that judgement content 
reflects the structure of knowledge only if judgement mechanics do. Beyond this, and until 
such time as a putative case-specific reason for eschewing the default might be identified, I’m 
not sure I have anything further to add on neurocognitive parity. 
 With this understanding of the rationale behind neurocognitive parity in mind, we can 
now apply the principle to the mechanics of knowledge attribution discussed in section two, 
thereby completing the argument that knowledge is (at least sometimes) a mental state. The 
structure of this argument is quite straightforward and might be expressed in the following 
way: 
 
(P1) There is a class of judgements C about cases of simple perceptual knowledge for 
which the following two conditions hold: 
 
9 Indeed, the idea that the reliability of our ToM capacities explains the evidential potential of the judgements 
they produce is the core idea of Nagel’s influential defense of the use of intuitive judgements in epistemology 
(2012). 
10 There is a potential worry here that the capacity for different substrates to realize the same judgement content, 
which is at least conceptually plausible, might undermine this assumption. However, I would note that 
everything I say here is entirely compatible with different sets of physical structures realizing the same 
judgement content/mechanics. For example, it need not be the case that just the TPJ (or even just brains) support 
belief-stage-free knowledge-attributing processes for us to think that the content of these judgements reflects the 
structure of knowledge in virtue of not having a belief-attribution stage. In short, it is the functional, not 
structural, characteristics that are important here. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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(P1a) The mechanics of judgements in class C treat knowledge as if it is a 
mental state. [Empirical] 
 
(P1b) The contents of judgements in class C reflect the structure of 
knowledge. 
 
(P2) The contents of judgements about knowledge reflect the structure of knowledge 
only if the mechanics of those judgements also reflect the structure of knowledge. 
[Neurocognitive Parity] 
 
(C1) The mechanics of judgements in class C reflect the structure of knowledge. [P1b 
and P2] 
 
(P3) If the mechanics of some class of judgements (i) reflect the structure of 
knowledge and (ii) treat knowledge as if it is a mental state, then knowledge is a 
mental state for the cases that are the subject of those judgements. [Reflection] 
 
(C2) For the cases of simple perceptual knowledge that are the subject of judgements 
in class C, knowledge is a mental state. [P1a, P3, and C1] 
 
 
In this way, neurocognitive parity facilitates the straightforward inference from attributing 
knowledge like a mental state (in these cases) to knowledge being a mental state (in these 
cases). Since this style of argument is mostly in the setup, there isn’t a ton to unpack here. 
(P1a) is just a straight-ahead expression of the empirical evidence discussed back in section 
2—Both studies (Phillips et al. 2018; Bricker 2020) document a class of judgements about 
knowledge, the mechanics of which treat knowledge like a mental state, and the plausibility 
of these direct findings is bolstered by a wealth of indirect evidence indicating that 
knowledge representation is evolutionarily and developmentally more basic than belief 
representation. Similarly, (P2) is just a direct application of neurocognitive parity, and the 
move from (P1b) and (P2) to (C1) is an uncomplicated, core inference directly supported by 
the principle. Since much of this section has been devoted to motivating neurocognitive 
parity, I don’t think I have anything to add here. Perhaps the move from (C1), (P1a), and (P3) 
to (C2) is a bit less transparent, but note that the sort of incorporation into our theories of 
knowledge expressed by (P3) is central to how I’m characterizing the reflection relation 
operative in (P1b). To say that some contents or mechanics reflect the structure of knowledge 
is just to say they tell us something we want our accounts of knowledge to accommodate. 
Thus, if some knowledge-reflecting judgement mechanics indicate that knowledge is a 
mental state, we can conclude that knowledge is in fact a mental state. 
This then just leaves (P1b), which I think is the only part of this argument that 
requires additional support. The operative question here is whether we think the contents of 
the judgements made by participants, particularly in the EEG study (Bricker 2020),11 reflect 
the structure of knowledge. I would submit that we have ample reason to think that they do. 
First, these are simple, ordinary, paradigmatic intuitive judgements about perceptual 
knowledge. This is clearly not a case in which “shifty patterns” of knowledge attribution 
(Gerken 2017, ch. 2) might lead us to question whether judgement content actually reflects 
 
11 I’ve opted to focus on my own study here, since it took care to report a wealth of relevant details re. whether 
participants were making judgements whose contents reflected the structure of knowledge. However, I do think 
that much of what I say also holds for the Phillips et al. (2018) study. 
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the nature of knowledge. Next, a number of different aspects of the study specifically indicate 
that its participants were reliable evaluators of the knowledge of others: (i) A pre-experiment 
procedure was used to ensure that, when completing knowledge attribution tasks, participants 
understood knowledge in a literal sense (2020, 5); (ii) participants with low judgement 
accuracy were excluded from the analysis, and mean error rates for participants included in 
the analysis were extremely low (≤ .001; 2020, 9); (iii) electrophysiological evidence, 
especially an ERP component known as the “late slow wave,” indicated that participants’ 
core ToM systems were indeed active during knowledge attribution, ruling out the possibility 
of a non-ToM heuristic response strategy (2020, 10-11). In short, these were by all accounts 
ordinary, reliable judgements about simple perceptual knowledge produced by competent 
knowledge evaluators. While the contents of these judgements aren’t all that 
epistemologically interesting, they nonetheless appear to be the kind that reflect the structure 
of knowledge. 
 For many, especially those of an experimentalist persuasion, this is likely sufficient. 
However, for some more traditional philosophers there may be a lingering worry—As these 
judgements are those of laypeople, not epistemological experts, perhaps their contents do not 
actually constitute evidence about the metaphysics of knowledge.12 This worry, however, 
might be quieted by noting the nature of the neurocognitive mechanisms of interest here (§2). 
These are not obscure biases or heuristics that are likely to differ between epistemologists 
and laypeople. Instead, these mechanisms constitute a core neurocognitive system 
responsible for judgements about knowledge. Accordingly, it is likely that these same 
mechanisms guide both experts and laypeople in (at least) their simple, ordinary judgements 
about perceptual knowledge. While it is plausible that education in epistemology might 
inoculate one from certain cognitive biases, it is much less plausible that this education 
reconfigures the core neurocognitive architecture of one’s entire ToM system. This then 
allows us to understand that, when epistemologists make judgements about knowledge under 
similar conditions, it is quite likely that the mechanisms underlying these judgements also 
treat knowledge like a mental state. In short, in cases of both philosophers and competent 
laypeople, we can be quite confident that there is in fact a class of judgements about 
knowledge for which both (P1a) and (P1b) are true. 
 With this final element in place, we might understand how the argument I’ve 
presented here straightforwardly applies neurocognitive parity, allowing us to conclude that 
knowledge is (at least sometimes) a mental state on the basis of empirical facts about the 
mechanics underlying knowledge attribution—Given that judgement content in these cases 
reflects the structure of knowledge, it follows directly from neurocognitive parity that the 
mechanics underlying these judgements also reflect the structure of knowledge. As these 
mechanics clearly treat knowledge like a mental state, we can then conclude that knowledge 
is in fact a mental state in such cases.  
 
 
5. Implications and Open Questions 
 
Before concluding this paper, I want to talk a bit about the precise implications of the 
argument I’ve presented above, on which neurocognitive parity is applied to our current 
understanding of how the brain computes knowledge attributions. Crucially, I want to be 
especially sure that we don’t go overboard and draw conclusions that the present argument is 
not in a position to support. Accordingly, here I’ll discuss three of the most important 
implications of the argument I’ve presented, along with the most likely ways in which one 
 
12 See, e.g., the “expertise defense.” (Williamson 2011; Nado 2014) 
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might overlook open questions and take each of these implications a little too far: (1) Again, 
my argument only supports the conclusion that perceptual knowledge is often a mental state, 
and I want to resist the urge to make the more general conclusion that knowledge is always a 
mental state. (2) While my argument highlights a fundamental problem with accounts of 
knowledge on which knowing is conceptualized as a species of belief, we cannot conclude on 
this basis anything like knowledge being conceptually prior to belief. (3) The theoretical 
framework provided by neurocognitive parity, along with the emergence of a knowledge-
centric Theory of Mind research program, offers important methodological implications 
regarding the use of the tools of psychology and neuroscience to address fundamental 
questions in epistemology. Nevertheless, it is not presently clear the extent to which this 
method might generalize, and we have reason to suspect that it might be limited to questions 
of knowledge and belief. Additionally, I also wish to be clear that (4) it isn’t obvious that my 
argument undermines the “entailment thesis” that knowing that p entails believing that p. In 
what follows, I discuss each of these points in turn. 
 First, as I’ve frequently repeated from the beginning of this paper, neurocognitive 
parity alone does not at this time support the conclusion that all knowledge states are mental 
states. Due to the presently limited body of available cognitive and neurocognitive evidence, 
the argument I’ve presented here can only support the conclusion that perceptual knowledge 
is often a mental state in ordinary cases, and even then, it cannot rule out perceptual 
knowledge sometimes being a composite in certain other cases. To be clear, I do recognize 
that there is likely a strong impulse among many epistemologists to maintain that knowledge 
must display a unitary metaphysical composition—Regardless of whether knowledge might 
be a mental or a composite state, it certainly cannot be the case that some knowledge states 
are composites whereas other knowledge states are mental. Indeed, I acknowledge that, if one 
is committed to such an assumption, one might then conclude on the basis of the argument 
I’ve presented here that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, full stop. Moreover, 
there is likely also an impulse among some knowledge-first epistemologists to think that the 
burden of proof now falls squarely on those who think that knowledge is a composite. Until 
such time as there is any evidence that the brain attributes knowledge like a composite, given 
the body of evidence pointing in the opposite direction (see §2), we can assume that it always 
attributes knowledge like a mental state. However, while I’m not strictly unsympathetic to 
either of these ideas, it is more reasonable at this point to view all this as an open empirical 
question. As it is all too easy to imagine that at least some small proportion of knowledge 
attributions might be computed like composites, while nonetheless appearing to reflect the 
structure of knowledge, I’m unconvinced of the wisdom of just assuming a unitary 
metaphysics a priori. Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether knowledge from sources 
other than perception also constitute mental states, as well as whether perceptual knowledge 
is exclusively a mental state. While I am not aware of any case in which a dualistic mental-
composite metaphysics of knowledge has been defended, or even examined, now might be 
the time for epistemologists to start acclimating to the idea. 
 Were the method I advocate for here to ultimately lead us to a dualistic mental-
composite metaphysics for knowledge, this of course would bring with it a series of major 
epistemological commitments. Perhaps most significantly, it would mean that there is no 
unity in kind for knowledge states at the level of the states themselves. Instead, multiple 
classes of states, with distinct metaphysical compositions, would fall under the category of 
knowledge. While this might at first seem a bit radical, I would submit that this picture fits 
nicely into a Craig-style approach to knowledge (1990), which identifies the central, unifying 
force behind knowledge with the role it plays for the knowledge attributor—i.e. identifying 
good informants. Taking such an approach, we might perhaps argue that, as both mental and 
composite states can play this central role in identifying good informants, it is only 
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reasonable to expect that the mechanics of our knowledge-attributing systems might be 
geared towards picking out both kinds of states. This sort of argument would echo a similar 
move from Pritchard, who has maintained that distinct anti-luck and ability conditions on 
knowledge states emerge from its singular role in identifying good informants (2012, §4). For 
those who insist that there must be some attributor-independent unity to knowledge states 
themselves, perhaps due to some special functional role played by knowledge for the knower, 
this would likely be an unacceptable cost of my account. However, at least for those who 
think this way on the basis of taking knowledge to be a natural kind (e.g. Kornblith 2002), the 
very idea that we can make inferences about the structure of knowledge from judgement 
content—a basic assumption of much of analytic epistemology that I explicitly commit to 
here—will be objectionable.  
 Additionally, were knowledge to display a dualistic metaphysics, which brought 
together otherwise disunified kinds, this would likely support a view on which the attribution 
or representation of knowledge states is in some sense metaphysically prior to knowledge 
states themselves. Such a view might take the form of social constructivism, on which 
knowledge is constituted by what ideal knowledge-attributing agents would judge to be 
knowledge, or perhaps alternatively a non-constructivist conferralism (see Sveinsdottir 2008), 
on which the property of knowing is conferred by (at least some) actual judgements of actual 
knowledge-attributing agents. While I don’t think this sort of anti-realist picture would be an 
especially negative consequence for my account—after all, the phylogeny of knowledge-
attributing capacities lets us tell a very natural story about how such capacities might have 
emerged in the absence of any attributor-independent knowledge states—I recognize that 
some might view this consequence less favorably. To the extent that this sort of anti-realist 
metaphysics of knowledge is undesirable, I must then concede that this would be a limitation 
of my account. However, again, it is important to reiterate that all this is purely speculative—
we presently have no empirical evidence indicating that knowledge displays any sort of 
dualistic mental-composite or associated anti-realist metaphysics. 
 Conversely, one of the major implications that quite definitively follows from my 
argument is that accounts of knowledge that take knowledge to be a composite of belief with 
non-mental components—which is to say, most of them (see footnote 2)—are flatly 
mistaken. As we’ve observed here, at least some cases of ordinary perceptual knowledge are 
not species of belief, but instead mental states in their own right, and traditional belief-centric 
accounts are unable to accommodate this result. However, it is important that we don’t go 
overboard with our conclusions here. As a number of commentators on Nagel’s argument 
have pointed out, this style of argument from knowledge attribution does not support the 
conclusion that knowledge is conceptually prior to belief (Butterfill 2013; Roessler 2013; 
Rysiew 2013).  
 Moving on, perhaps the most significant long-term implications here are 
methodological. As I’ve argued above, the principle of neurocognitive parity can serve as an 
invaluable tool for inferring the nature of knowledge from the nature of knowledge 
attributions, at least in cases where we would already be comfortable inferring the nature of 
knowledge from the content of knowledge attributions. If then coupled with cognitive and 
neurocognitive studies of knowledge attribution, this suggests a powerful new approach to 
theorizing about the structure of knowledge, on which epistemologists might conduct such 
studies with the specific aim of answering outstanding epistemological questions. While the 
studies discussed here specifically aimed to address whether knowledge is attributed like a 
mental or composite state, there is no reason why new studies couldn’t target other questions 
as well. In this way, we might understand epistemological questions about the nature of 
knowledge to be directly continuous with empirical questions about the neurocognitive 
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mechanisms of knowledge attribution, with the empirical techniques of cognitive 
(neuro)science themselves constituting genuine ways of doing epistemology. 
However, here again it is important we exercise some moderation. First, far from 
fulfilling some grand neurophilosophical ambition in the vein of Churchland (e.g. 1987), this 
method would still heavily rely on both traditional epistemology and standard experimental 
philosophy. Not only does the application of neurocognitive parity require that we can be 
confident in the evidential potential of judgement content, a task that will inevitably require 
more established epistemological methods, but the cognitive neuroscience of knowledge 
attribution itself requires significant contributions from both traditional and experimental 
epistemology. Conceptualizing knowledge states is a task for traditional epistemology (see 
especially Bricker 2020, §1.1; Phillips et al. 2020, §2), and ensuring that participants are 
reliable knowledge attributors falls directly under the purview of attribution reports and 
experimental epistemology (see Bricker 2020, §4.5). Moreover, beyond its reliance on more 
conventional methods, we have a second reason to temper any excess enthusiasm about 
neurocognitive parity fueling the next big advancement in philosophical methodology: 
Inferring the structure of knowledge from the mechanics of knowledge attribution only works 
because, as discussed in section two, knowledge attribution relies on specific neural 
mechanisms that can be isolated experimentally. However, this likely isn’t the case for many 
philosophically interesting concepts outside or even within epistemology. While this is of 
course ultimately an empirical question, and future developments could very well prove my 
caution unnecessary, it is important that we recognize that anything like an immediate, full-
scale generalization of the method suggested here is unlikely to be successful. 
 Finally, I want to briefly mention that I’m not confident that this argument currently 
gives us reason to reject the entailment thesis that knowing that p entails believing that p. 
While the available neurocognitive evidence indicates that belief attribution is not a 
component of (at least certain) knowledge attributions, this evidence seems to come from 
cases that depict knowledge only when they also depict belief (for more on this, see Bricker 
2020, §4.5). In contrast with other evidence from standard experimental epistemology (e.g. 
Murry et al. 2013; Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel 2013), we presently have no direct 
evidence relating to the mechanics of knowledge attribution in cases where participants might 
withhold belief attribution. 
 Lest we end things too dourly, however, I do want to reiterate that there are multiple 
quite significant implications to be drawn from the argument I’ve presented here. Not only 
might we confidently conclude that knowledge is at least sometimes a mental state, contra an 
attitude widely held in philosophy, but we might do so via an innovative new approach that 
pairs traditional methods with epistemology-driven cognitive neuroscience. While the exact 
limits of this approach are not yet apparent, I am confident that this is by no means the end of 





Here my goal was to advance a new line of support for the thesis that knowledge is mental 
state. Central to this argument was the principle of neurocognitive parity, on which 
judgement content reflects the structure of knowledge only if the neural and cognitive 
mechanics responsible for that content also reflect the structure of knowledge. Taken together 
with recent findings from cognitive neuroscience, this indicates that there are cases in which 
being in some mental state is sufficient for knowing that p. However, as the available (direct) 
cognitive and neurocognitive evidence is presently quite limited, I am hesitant to conclude on 
this basis that being in this particular mental state is also necessary for knowledge. 
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Nevertheless, it is at this point clear that the widely accepted composite view of knowledge 
simply doesn’t capture the relationship between knowing and the mental. Knowledge is—at 
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